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In the SupreJDe Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH

Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

7292

THOMAS R. ROBINSON

A. ppellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant, Thomas Ray
Robinson, from the verdict finding him guilty of the
crime of rape and from the judgment of the trial court
and from the whole thereof. Appellant's argument is
that there was insufficient evidence to convict, and that
there was no lawful evidence to support the judgment
of conviction and sentence. The argument is based primarily upon the fact that Avis Barter, a 14-year-old
girl with subnormal intelligence, was permitted without
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objection to testify to the necessary facts to establish
the corpus delicti of the crime of rape. Respondent takes
the position that there was sufficient competent evidence to support the conviction and has organized argument under the following assertions:

ASSERTION NO.

1

QUESTIONS OF COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES AND
EVIDENCE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

ASSERTION NO. 2
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS HAD SUFFICIENT
MENTAL CAPACITY TO BE A
COMPETENT WITNESS.

ASSERTION NO. 3
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES WHO
TESTIFIED TO THE ACTS AND DECLARATIONS
OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WAS
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Appellant's brief contains a resume of the evidence
and therefore respondent refrains from presenting any
independent statement of facts, except where respondent will refer to certain testimony which appellant
failed to point out in his brief.
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NO. 1

QUESTIOXS OF COMPETENCY OF \YITNESSES AND
EVIDEXCE C.-\.NNOT BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TI~IE ON APPEAL.

Appellant's contention, that an objection to the
sufficiency of an infornwtion 1nay be raised for the
first time on appeal, will be disregarded inasmuch as
the point is not urged, nor is there any indication of
insufficiency of the information in appellant's brief.
Respondent, however, challenges appellant's corollary
namely, that an objection that there is no evidence to
prove the offense charged may be raised for the first
time on appeal.
At no time during the course of the trial did defendant's counsel object to the testimony of Avis Barter, nor did he object to the testi1nony of other witnesses who testified to the acts and declarations made
by Avis Barter subsequent to the offense charged and
prior to the trial. It is rather obvious that counsel's
reason for not objecting to the testimony of these witnesses, including that of A vis Barter, was that he was
anxious to have in evidence the time during which the
alleged offense occurred so that he could later put on
evidence to establish defendant's alibi. In other words,
apparently counsel was more interested in the alibi as
a defense than he was in the exclusion of the evidence
for the state which he might have thought incompetent.
Concerning this type of tactics, Jones in his Commentaries on Evidence, at volume 5, page 3904, has the
following to say:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"If, after examination in chief has begun,
it (preliminary inquiry into competency) is not
made upon discovery, it is waived. A party knowing facts which would disqualify the witness if
brought to the attention of the court is not perInitted to let the testimony go in while listening
thereto to determine whether it will be favorable,
and then move to strike out the testimony on the
ground that the witness who gave it was incompetent.****
"***and plainly error cannot be protected
on consideration of the testimony of a witness
on the ground that such witness was incompetent where no objection whatever on the score
of incompetency as a witness was made at the
trial. * * * * "
Jones cites: People vs Evans, 63 Cal. App. 777,
220 Pac. 309; and Carr vs State (Okla. Crim.) 211
Pac. 423.
The general rule is stated in 24 C.J.S. 268, as follows:
"It is an almost universal rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."

An exception is discussed in the same volume at page
307, concerning the rna tter of jurisdiction.
In discussing the question of competency of evidence and applying the above quoted general rule, Corpus Juris cites a Utah case, State vs. Murphy, 68 Pac.
(2d) .188; 92 Utah 382. Similarly, according to Corpus
Juris, the rule is applied to the competency of witnesses,
and objections thereto, unless raised at the trial, will
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not be available on appeal. People vs Collins, 5 Cal.
App. 654; 91 Pac. 158.
It is interesting to note that although in the State
of Texas the cases seem to have required less evidence
of insanity to render a witness incompetent than in
other states, the court in the case of Hubbard vs State
(1912) 66 Tex. Crim. Rep. 378, 147 S. W. 260, held
that unless the questions were raised at the trial, the
appellate court could not go into the matter. The court
in assigning its reason for dismissing appellants argument that the prosecuting witness was not competent
to testify, said:
"The record shows that the appellant did
not object to the testimony of the witness Melissa Jennings at the time she testified nor did he
attempt, so far as the record shows, to show on
his voir dire examination that she was so insane
as to prevent her testifying."
ASSERTION NO. 2
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS HAD SUFFICIENT
MENTAL CAPACITY TO BE A
COMPETENT WITNESS.

It might be well at this point to quote Section 10449-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, so far as it pertains
to witnesses of unsound mind:
"The following persons cannot be witnesses:
1-Those who are of unsound mind at the time
of their production for examination."
We find no annotations to this particular provision.
However, we cite State vs Williams, 180 Pac. (2d)
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551, a case recently decided by this court and cited by

appellant as similar to the case at bar. In that case this
court held that the admission of testimony of a girl of
subnormal intellect over the objection of defense counsel was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It
is indicated in the court's opinion that there was a difficulty on the part of the complaining witness to understand questions, quite similar to that of Avis Barter, if
not worse. Yet the court in sustaining the trial judge's
ruling said:
"Furthermore, the witness, insofar as revealed by the record, had difficulty in understanding questions of an uncomplicated nature
propounded to her by counsel. However, the
trial judge had the advantage of having the witness before him. He was in a position to observe
not only her demeanor but the tempo of question and answer, the attitude and tone of voice
of counsel and the probable effect upon the child
of the court room environment. Hence, much of
importance to his decision respecting the competency of the witness was available to the trial
judge which the record does not reveal to us.
He exercised his discretion in the light of such
additional factors, and we are unable to say with
conviction that his ruling thereon was an abuse
of such discretion. See State v. MacMillan, 46
Utah 19, 145 P. 833; State v. Morasco, 42 Utah
5, 128 P. 571; State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378,
379, 58 P. 1108."

Respondent submits that under the Williams case
a trial court should find no particular difficulty in per-
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mitting a witness of the mental capacity of A vis Barter to testify.
Referring again to Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, \rol. 5, the following is found at page 3971:
"The general rule, therefore, is that a lunatic or person affected with insanity may testify
as a witness if he has sufficient understanding to
apprehend the obligation of an oath and to be
capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to
the questions at issue. Whether he has that understanding is a question to be determined by
the court, upon examination of the party himself and any con1petent witnesses who can speak
to the nature and extent of the insanity."
And at page 3948, included in a general discussion on
mental capacity, is the following:
"It is not necessary to discuss the proposition that a witness is not to be excluded as incompetent by reason of the fact that his memory is somewhat defective, or because his means
of knowledge may not be equal to that of other
persons who might have been called as witnesses.
Obviously these are objections which affect the
credibility and not the competency of the witnesses."
At the trial, evidence was adduced to the effect
that Avis Barter's mental capacity was that of a five
year old child. There are many things concerning which
a child of five years is competent to testify. Though
she may have been confused and had difficulty in unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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derstanding questions concerning distances, time, and
number of blocks, etc., she was certainly competent
when she came to the matter of describing the interior
of the green coupe. Any 5-year old child would remember the ball and flower hanging from the top of
the windshield.
The courts recognize that there are many things
of which a person of subnormal intellect may testify.
An example of this is that in many cases of rape committed against the person of a victim of unsound mind,
the victim has been permitted to testify in behalf of
the state. An annotation of these cases is found in
148 A.L.R. at page 1153. The general rule is stated
as follows:
"In prosecutions for rape upon a female
of unsound or imbecile mind, the mental condition of the victim, even if rendering her incapable of consenting to the act, does not suffice
to render her incompetent ·as a witness against
the perpetrator, who must ~how that she fails
to meet the tests of appreciation of the nature of
an oath and ability to so answer questions as to
express a correct reproduction of facts, in order
to exclude her."
ASSERTION NO. 3
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES WHO
TESTIFIED TO THE ACTS AND DECLARATIONS
OF THE PROSECUTING WITNESS WAS
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

Appellant argues that the testimony of persons
other than the prosecutrix in which they testify to
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acts and declarations of the prosecutrix subsequent to
the asserted attack on her and prior to the trial is inadmissable, as being heresay. One of the exceptions to
the heresay rule, however, is the res gestae rule, which,
as applied to this case, means that declarations and acts
of the victim, . .~vis Barter, Iuade soon after the alleged
criminal attack upon her, as testified to by third persons, are competent evidence of the corpus delicti. The
writer of an annotation in 157 A.L.R. at page 1363,
discusses the admissibility of statements of the victim
in rape cases as part of res gestae as follows:
Declarations admitted as res gestae constitute original evidence and are not admitted as
corroborative of a witness but on the theory that
they are verbal acts connected with the transaction and calculated to illustrate its character.
Under this theory, although the victim of rape or
a similar offense is not a witness, both the fact
that she made complaint and the details thereof
are admissible in evidence where her statements
and declarations were made under such circumstances as to constitute a part of the res gestae.
Cases are cited where complaints were made several moments after, even as much as an hour and a
half after, the offense was committed, and where the
admission of such complaints, statements or declarations was not held to be error.
The above quoted annotation also states that although there is a conflict of authority several cases have
held that, where the victim is incompetent to testify,
evidence of the fact she made complaint is admissible
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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even though not a part of the res gestae. See page 1361
of 157 A.L.R. _citing several cases which support the
proposition that if Avis Barter had been barred from
testifying as an incompetent witness, the court under
the rule of these cases could properly admit, as it did,
the testimony of others to the effect that Avis Barter
made complaint of the offense.
An inference derived from the above annotation is
that if the victim is allowed to testify then there is no
question about the admissibility of evidence of her
declarations to others as corroborating evidence. Therefore if this court should hold that Avis Barter was
properly permitted to testify, it would seem there is
no question about the admission of evidence of her
declarations and acts subsequent to the offense and
prior to the trial.
If, however, this court should rule that the testimony of Avis Barter was improperly admitted, even
though no objection was raised at the trial, it then
becomes necessary to decide whether or not evidence
of said declarations and acts should have been admitted. If the court follows what we submit is the majority rule, that declarations and acts by the victim
shortly after the alleged sexual offense are admissible
as part of the res gestae, then it is submitted there
is sufficient evidence to convict.
Mr. Heath testified to declarations made by Avis
Barter in which Avis described the man who attacked
her and also the automobile that was involved. (Tr.
105, 106). This was within 15 minutes of the time Avis
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arrived at the hmne of her aunt, ~1rs. Brimhall, A vis
haYing arrived there at 1 :~5 P.l\L (Tr. 67) and having
commenced her conversation with Mr. Heath at 2:00
P.)I. (Tr. 69). About 30 minutes later, after Avis had
been returned to her hmne, a car drove up to the home
of )lr. and ~Irs. Barter, and ~Irs. Barter testified to
AYis's declaration as follows:

Q. Did you see the defendant, who sits at the
counsel table on the right hand side of counsel table on that day?
A.

1""es, sir.

Q.

And about what tirne was it you first saw
him?

A.

Well, it was going on for two thirty when
they brought him back in front of our house.

Q.

Where was Avis at that time?

A.

She was in the house with us.

Q.

And was Avis with you when you first saw
him?

A.

Yes, she was in the front room.

Q.

I will ask you to state whether or not she
identified this man?

A.

Yes, sir; she was the first one. We heard
the siren on the car and she hollered, aoh,
here they come. They have got him. That is
the car and the man., That is just the way
she worded it before we all got to the window to see for ourselves.
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It is submitted that this exclamation coming spontaneously and so soon after the offense must certainly
be considered as part of the res gestae.
CONCLUSION
The testimony of Avis Barter was properly admitted, and was sufficient for conviction. This testimony was supported by properly admitted evidence
of acts and declarations of Avis Barter as part of the
res gestae and as complaints corroborating her testimony.
Any questions as to the competency of the witness
or evidence should have been raised at the trial, and
not having done so, appellant is barred from raising
them on appeal. For these reasons it is submitted that
your honorable court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,

Attorney General
ROBERT S. RICHARDS,

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent.
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